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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 890423-CA 
v. : 
RANDALL D. TUCKER, t Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for theft, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), as the appeal is from a 
district court in a criminal case not involving a conviction of a 
first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court correctly allowed 
impeachment of defendant by use of a prior conviction and 
evidence of other crimes, and whether the trial court properly 
denied defendant's motion for mistrial based on this impeachment. 
The standard of review for a court's ruling on evidentiary issues 
is whether the court so abused its discretion that there is a 
likelihood that injustice resulted. State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 
1032, 1035 (Utah 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 31, 1989, defendant was charged, along with a 
codefendant, with two counts of burglary, both third degree 
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990), and 
one count of theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) (Record [hereafter R.] at 9-10). 
After preliminary hearing, one count of burglary against 
defendant, alleged to have occurred on or about March 27, 1989, 
was dismissed (R. at 3 and 9). 
On May 17, 1989, the day trial began, the codefendant 
pled guilty to one count of burglary (R. at 45-51 and 54). 
Defendant was tried by jury on one count of burglary and one 
count of theft on May 17-18, 1989, in the Third Judicial District 
Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, 
district judge, presiding (R. at 52-53 and 65-66). On the first 
day of trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the 
State from presenting evidence of defendant's prior felony 
convictions for failure to comply with an officer's signal to 
stop, committed in 1981, and attempted forgery, committed in 
1988. The motion was made pursuant to rules 609, 403, and 
404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (R. at 55-56). 
A hearing on the motion in limine was conducted at 
trial, outside of the presence of the jury, after opening 
statements were given by counsel (R. at 52, 124 at 66, and 123 at 
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2-15). The motion was denied, with the court placing its 
findings on the record (R. at 52 and 123 at 11-15). During 
trial, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, claiming that the 
prosecution had exceeded the proper scope in questioning 
defendant about his prior conviction. The trial court denied the 
motion, finding that defendant had opened the door for such 
extensive cross-examination by his own testimony (R. 125 at 40-
47). 
The jury acquitted defendant of burglary and convicted 
him of theft (R. at 65-66). On June 5, 1989, Judge Murphy 
sentenced defendant to a term not to exceed five years in the 
Utah State Prison and a fine. The sentence was stayed and 
defendant placed on probation for thirty-six months with 
specified terms and conditions (R. at 106-107). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 29, 1989, 90-year old Harvey D. Hansen drove 
to 1186 South Redwood Road. Mr. Hansen had owned that property 
for many years and had used the dwelling there as an office (R. 
123 at 16-17). Next to the dwelling was a storage shed which was 
kept locked, and which contained personal property belonging to 
Mr. Hansen's son (R. 123 at 17-18). 
As Mr. Hansen pulled into the driveway on the property 
at approximately noon that day, he saw a car parked at the back 
of the buildings (R. 123 at 17). The trunk of the car was open, 
and Mr. Hansen saw items in the trunk and in the passenger area 
of the car which had been stored in the shed (R. 123 at 18-19). 
Defendant was standing in front of the car and Mr. Hansen asked 
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him what was going on (R. 123 at 20-21). Defendant did not 
respond and Mr. Hansen walked back to his own car. Mr. Hansen 
took down the license plate number of the suspect car (R. 123 at 
21-22). As he was writing down the number, the codefendant came 
from behind the shed, got into the car along with defendant, 
backed around Mr. Hansen's car and drove away on Redwood Road (R. 
123 at 22) . 
After they left, Mr. Hansen telephoned the police and 
gave dispatch the license number and a description of the car (R. 
123 at 23). A short time later, the police called Mr. Hansen to 
tell him that they had located the car (R. 123 at 23). Officers 
picked up Mr. Hansen and took him to a trailer park three to four 
blocks from the Hansen property (R. 123 at 26-27 and 79). There 
Mr. Hansen identified the car, items in the car as those taken 
from the shed, and defendant (R. 123 at 27-29 and 79-81). No one 
had been given permission to be in the shed or take the property 
(R. 123 at 44). 
When an officer had first approached the trailer at 
which the car was parked, the codefendant answered the door (R. 
125 at 4). In response to the officer's question, the 
codefendant said that "Randy Tucker" had been with him when he 
was at the shed (R. 125 at 5). Pursuant to consent, officers 
searched the trailer house and found defendant hiding under a bed 
(R. 125 at 6). 
At trial, defendant testified that he had been with the 
codefendant that day to work on the codefendant's car and the 
codefendant had been taking defendant home (R. 125 at 16-17). 
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Defendant said that the codefendant stopped at the Hansen 
property to pick up some items (R. 125 at 17). When Mr. Hansen 
arrived, defendant became suspicious about the codefendant's 
presence there and read off the license plate number of the 
codefendant's car to Mr. Hansen (R. 125 at 20 and 30-32). When 
the two defendants left, Mr. Hansen directed them in getting 
their car out of the driveway (R. 125 at 21 and 32). Defendant 
said that there was no personal property in the car when he and 
the codefendant drove from the Hansen property to the trailer 
house (R. 123 at 20-22 and 30-31). According to defendant, on 
the way to the trailer house the codefendant said that he wanted 
to return the personal property he had taken earlier. The 
codefendant hauled it out of the trailer house and was putting it 
into the car when the police arrived (R. 125 at 22). Defendant 
said that he had never seen the stolen items until the police 
officers took them out of the codefendant's trailer (R. 125 at 
24). 
On direct examination by his counsel, defendant 
testified that he had previously been convicted of attempted 
forgery. Defendant then explained his version of the 
circumstances surrounding that conviction (R. 125 at 24-25; the 
text of defendant's testimony regarding this conviction is 
attached as Addendum A). 
On rebuttal, the codefendant testified that defendant 
had helped him move the property from inside the shed to the 
outside and had driven the car away from the Hansen property (R. 
125 at 67 and 71-73). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence that 
defendant had a prior conviction for attempted forgery was 
properly admitted. Cross-examination about the details of that 
conviction normally would have been improper; however, defendant 
opened the door for such cross-examination. On direct 
examination, defendant attempted to minimize his guilt for the 
previous offense, and the prosecution then was allowed to impeach 
defendant with details he had previously given about the prior 
conviction. 
A separate but related issue was the introduction of 
evidence of prior illicit drug use on the part of defendant. 
While he had not been convicted of a crime based on this 
evidence, he was properly cross-examined about it. The cross-
examination was appropriate because, again, defendant opened the 
door to the questioning by his own testimony on direct 
examination. 
Further, defendant has waived any right to challenge 
the prosecution's cross-examination about the details of his 
prior conviction by failing to object to the questioning at 
trial. Defendant only objected to the introduction of the 
evidence of illicit drug use, a matter which was not charged and 
of which he had no prior conviction. 
Defendant's arguments are based on rules 403 and 404, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. When analyzed, it becomes clear that 
these provisions, because of their generality and rule 404's 
specific applicability to character evidence, are not as 
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applicable to this argument as are the specific provisions of 
rules 608 and 609. The latter rules specifically apply to 
impeachment testimony and thus supercede use of more general 
rules in that area of evidence. The evidence of defendant's 
other crimes or wrongs was admissible as pure impeachment; it was 
not offered or admitted as character evidence. 
Even if the evidence of a prior conviction and other 
crimes had been improperly admitted, their admission was harmless 
error at most. The trial court admonished and instructed the 
jury that such evidence was only to be used for impeachment 
purposes. In addition, other evidence produced at trial, 
untainted by the challenged evidence of conviction or of other 
crimes, was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. There is 
no likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant if the 
challenged evidence were excluded. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE 
OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION FOR A CRIME 
INVOLVING DISHONESTY AND EVIDENCE OF OTHER 
CRIMES BY DEFENDANT. 
It is unclear what defendant is specifically arguing as 
grounds for appeal. There appears to be a general challenge that 
the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss because, 
he alleges, the prosecution went beyond permissible bounds in 
cross-examining him regarding the details of his previous 
conviction. Included in that argument is a challenge that the 
prosecution impermissibly questioned defendant regarding prior 
crimes or wrongs which did not result in a conviction. While 
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these two claims are interrelated, they are not the same claim 
and are treated under different rules of evidence. This brief 
will address the two claims separately. 
A. Waiver. 
In order to address either issue, it is important to 
first determine whether both issues have been preserved for 
appeal. It is clearly established that: 
[a] general rule of appellate review in 
criminal cases in Utah is that a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of 
specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record 
before an appellate court will review such 
claim on appeal. 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987) (footnote 
omitted). Thus, a defendant has waived the right to object to 
the admission of evidence if he or she did not raise a timely 
objection to admission at trial. 
Defendant testified on direct examination by his 
counsel that he had been convicted of attempted forgery. When 
the prosecutor cross-examined him about that conviction, 
defendant did not object to questioning about the details of the 
crime itself (R. 125 at 25-27; Addendum A). It was not until the 
prosecutor asked defendant about his stated purpose for cashing 
the checks, i.e., to support a drug habit, that defense counsel 
raised an objection. There was a sidebar conference and the 
objection was overruled (R. 125 at 27; Addendum A). 
Shortly thereafter, the defense rested and defendant 
moved for a mistrial on the basis of the prosecution's cross-
examination (R. 125 at 40; Addendum A). That motion was tied to 
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the objection which had been discussed in the unreported sidebar 
conference (R. 125 at 41; Addendum A). The objection and the 
motion both were limited to the prosecution's elicitation of 
evidence of other crimes or wrongs, i.e., illicit drug use (R. 
125 at 40-41). No argument was made regarding the prosecution 
eliciting additional details about the prior conviction itself, 
such as the number of checks and amount of money taken. The 
objection only dealt with the questions regarding the purpose 
defendant had given for committing the forgeries. Since an 
objection was not raised to the other details of the prior 
conviction, defendant is now precluded from challenging on appeal 
the introduction of those other details. 
B. Analysis Under Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Even if this Court decides to reach the merits of the 
issues raised by defendant, his claims are without merit. 
Defendant's general contention is that the trial court improperly 
allowed the prosecution to cross examine defendant regarding 
details of his prior conviction for attempted forgery. Defendant 
concedes that the case of State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 529 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) held that forgery is a crime of dishonesty or false 
statement and is therefore admissible under rule 609(a)(2), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (Brief of Appellant at 11). However, defendant 
complains that the court allowed the prosecution to extend 
questioning beyond permissible limits. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that: 
[T]his Court will not reverse the trial 
court's ruling on evidentiary issues unless 
it is manifest that the court so abused its 
discretion that there is a likelihood that 
injustice resulted. 
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State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1987) (citations 
omitted). In a situation more specific to the issue of exclusion 
of evidence of prior convictions, the Court has said: 
The standard for reversal in cases 
involving an erroneous failure to exclude 
prior convictions is whether absent the 
error, there was a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result for the defendant. 
State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989) (citations 
omitted). The standard, then, is whether the trial court abused 
its discretion by allowing evidence of a prior conviction to 
reach the jury, and whether the error in admitting that evidence, 
if any, prejudiced defendant. 
In explaining the predecessor to rule 609, Utah Rules 
of Evidence, the Utah Supreme Court stated the general rule 
regarding questioning a defendant about prior convictions. The 
Court said: 
Also assigned as error is the cross-
examination of the defendant as to prior 
convictions. It was elicited upon cross-
examination that the defendant had several 
prior felony convictions, unrelated to the 
instant charge, and he maintains that this 
amounted to a general assault upon his 
character and thus constituted prejudicial 
error. This is also without merit. When an 
accused voluntarily takes the witness stand 
he may be asked whether or not he has ever 
been convicted of a felony. Such a question 
is sanctioned by statute. If the accused 
answers in the affirmative, he may be asked 
the nature of the felony. Further, the 
accused may be asked if he has been convicted 
of more than one felony, and if so, the type 
or nature thereof. 
However, the details or circumstances 
surrounding the felony or felonies for which 
the accused was convicted may not be inquired 
into except under unusual circumstances[.] 
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State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407, 409 (1963) 
(footnotes omitted). This statement of the law has not changed 
substantially since the adoption of the Utah Rules of Evidence in 
1983. 
Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides the means by 
which the credibility of a witness, including a defendant, may be 
attacked. The pertinent portion of the rule reads: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him 
or established by public record during cross-
examination but only if the crime . . . (2) 
involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
The premise behind this rule is that crimes which "were committed 
by fraudulent or deceitful means bear[] directly on the accused's 
likelihood to testify truthfully." State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 
656 (Utah 1989) . 
This rule, based verbatim on the corresponding federal 
rule of evidence, raises: 
a problem in reconciling two potentially 
conflicting rules of evidence. Thus, on the 
one hand, a jury cannot properly infer from 
evidence of prior criminal convictions that 
the accused is a bad man, who, with a proven 
propensity to commit crimes, probably 
committed the crime in question. . . . Yet, 
on the other hand, the credibility of a 
defendant, like that of any other witness, is 
subject to impeachment through evidence of 
his prior convictions. 
United States v. Tumblin, 551 F.2d 1001, 1004 (5th Cir. 1977). 
Because of this conflict, the Utah Supreme Court has decreed 
that: 
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[w]hen impeaching a defendant, or any other 
witness, by conviction of a prior felony, it 
is permissible to inquire only into the fact 
and nature of the prior conviction, but not, 
except in unusual circumstances, the 
surrounding details or circumstances. 
State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1982). 
This general rule has an exception which has been 
expounded in federal case law. This Court, in State v. Ross, 782 
P.2d 529 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), explained the position of federal 
case law in interpreting rule 609: 
The Utah Supreme Court noted that "Utah's 
Rule 609 is the federal rule verbatim," and 
advised that "federal case law should be 
consulted for advice in interpreting the 
rule." 
782 P.2d at 530 (quoting State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 17 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988)). Regarding questioning about the details of a 
prior conviction, federal case law provides that: 
[o]rdinarily, it is improper for the 
prosecution to examine into the details of 
the crime for which the accused was 
convicted. The cross-examination should be 
confined to a showing of the essential facts 
of convictions, the nature of the crimes, and 
the punishment. Care should be taken to 
protect the accused as far as possible from 
being convicted because of past conduct and 
not the crime for which he is being tried. . 
. . A different situation is presented when 
an accused, on direct examination, attempts 
to explain away the effect of the conviction 
or to minimize his guilt. In such cases the 
defendant may be cross-examined on any facts 
which are relevant to the direct examination. 
• . . "[H]e has no right to set forth to the 
jury all the facts which tend in his favor 
without laying himself open to a cross-
examination upon those facts." 
United States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d 1376, 1381 (10th Cir. 1977) 
(quoting Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900)). 
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See also United States v, Amahia, 825 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir. 
1987) ("when a witness 'opens the door' by denial of guilt of the 
prior conviction, a more detailed cross-examination is 
permissible.") 
In the present case, defendant opened the door for the 
prosecution to question him about the details of his prior 
conviction. The trial court had already determined that evidence 
of the fact of the attempted forgery conviction was admissible. 
Defendant then chose to testify and to allow himself to be cross-
examined about his testimony and about "matters affecting the 
credibility of the [defendant]." Utah R. Evid. 611(b). As a 
trial tactic, defendant chose to testify about his prior 
conviction on direct examination by his own counsel. However, 
defendant did not limit his testimony to the mere fact of his 
previous conviction; he chose, instead, to testify about the 
"circumstances surrounding that offense and [his] ultimate 
conviction[.]" (R. 125 at 25; Addendum A). He attempted to 
minimize his guilt in the previous case, testifying that it was 
his own money in his sister's bank account and that he had forged 
his sister's name to a check to get his own money. He said that 
the money involved was less than $100.00. He also testified that 
he needed the money to move into his own house (R. 125 at 25; 
Addendum A). The prosecution was then permitted to discredit 
that testimony by showing that the facts previously admitted by 
defendant when pleading guilty to the attempted forgery did not 
match the testimony he was then giving. Defendant, on cross-
examination, admitted that he had taken five checks from his 
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mother and forged her name to some of them. He also admitted 
that the amount involved was in excess of $600.00 (R. 125 at 25-
26). On cross-examination, defendant denied that he had cashed 
the checks to support a drug habit. It was at this juncture that 
defense counsel interposed an objectionf which was overruled 
after a sidebar conference (R. 125 at 27). The prosecution was 
then entitled to challenge defendant's credibility using a 
statement which defendant had filled out in conjunction with the 
earlier conviction. In this statement, defendant had indicated 
that he had forged the checks to support a drug habit (R. 125 at 
28). When confronted with this information, defendant said that 
he did not remember whether he had made such a statement. The 
prosecution then impeached defendant's credibility by questioning 
him about his prior drug use to demonstrate that defendant had 
been untruthful in his trial testimony regarding the purpose for 
the money obtained in the forgeries (R. 125 at 28). 
Given defendant's attempts to minimize his guilt in the 
earlier case and his trial testimony, which was clearly 
contradictory to the facts of the earlier case, the questioning 
by the prosecutor was proper impeachment of defendant. The 
details elicited on cross-examination demonstrated the 
untruthfulness of defendant's testimony on direct examination. 
From this information, the jury was allowed to judge the 
credibility of defendant in his testimony about the current 
charges. 
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C. The Applicability of Rules 403, 404 and 608, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
Defendant argues that the trial court was required to 
make a determination under rules 403 and 404, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, regarding the probative versus prejudicial impact of 
evidence of his prior conviction. He cites the Wolf case noted 
above for this proposition. It is at this juncture in his 
argument that defendant blurs the distinction between admission 
of evidence of prior convictions under rule 609(a) and admission 
of evidence of specific instances of conduct for the purpose of 
impeachment. Defendant lumps them all under evidence of prior 
convictions and argues rule 609 only. 
The applicability of rules 403 and 404 in rule 609(a) 
arguments is dependent upon which subsection of rule 609(a) is 
relied on in the case. In State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 528, this 
Court borrowed from federal case law in analyzing the interplay 
of rules 403 and 609(a): 
[W]e look to federal case law and find that 
"[e]vidence of a conviction of forgery, which 
is a crime involving dishonesty and false 
statement, is mandatorily admissible for 
impeachment purposes" under Rule 609(a). 
Clearly, under Utah law, the crime of 
attempted forgery involves the same 
culpability and dishonesty as does the crime 
of forgery itself. Therefore, attempted 
forgery is automatically admissible under 
Rule 609(a)(2), and the trial court ruled 
correctly in admitting the evidence of 
defendant's prior conviction. 
782 P.2d at 530-31 (quoting United States v. Bay, 762 F.2d 1314, 
1317 (9th Cir. 1984)) (emphasis added). Ross next argued that 
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rule 403 precluded admission of his prior conviction even if rule 
609 did not. Because rule 403 is verbatim to the federal rule, 
this Court again looked to federal law to resolve this claim. 
This Court said: 
The federal courts that have ruled on Rules 
609 and 403 in tandem have held that the 
trial court has no discretion to exclude 
prior crimes involving dishonesty or false 
statement. 
In United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349 
(1st Cir. 1981), the First Circuit stated, 
"We are driven by the force of explicit 
statutory language and legislative history to 
hold that evidence offered under Rule 
609(a)(2) is not subject to the general 
balancing provision of Rule 403." Ici. at 
354. The Kiendra court pointed out that Rule 
403 is permissive, while Rule 609 is 
mandatory: "Rule 403 provides, 'Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded' . . . 
Rule 609(a) provides, 'evidence that he has 
been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted. '" JEd. (emphasis added) . 
Therefore, we hold that where Rule 609 is 
applicable, its mandatory language supercedes 
[sic] the permissive language of Rule 403. 
Kiendra also distinguished between the 
general provisions of Rule 403 and the 
specific provisions of Rule 609: "Rule 403 
is a general provision intended to govern a 
wide landscape of evidentiary concerns; Rule 
609 is a narrow provision intended to 
regulate the impeachment of witnesses who 
have been convicted of prior crimes." Ici. at 
354. The court found that the drafters of 
Rule 403 did not expect it to "prevail over 
more specific rules; it was 'designed as a 
guide for the handling of situations for 
which no specific rules have been 
formulated.'" Ici. Fed.R.Evid. 403 advisory 
committee's note. 
In pertinent part, rule 403 reads: 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice[.] 
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782 P.2d at 531 (footnote omitted). This Court concluded that 
evidence of a previous conviction for a crime involving 
dishonesty or false statement (specifically, attempted forgery) 
was properly admissible without a rule 403 balancing. Id. 
2 
This same analysis would seem to apply to rule 404. 
Rule 404 deals generally with character evidence, "offered for 
substantive purposes rather than for impeachment[.]" Boyce and 
Kimball, Utah Rules of Evidence 1983, 1 Utah L. Rev. 81 (1985). 
That general rule is expressly limited by the provisions of rules 
607, 608, and 609 in the area of impeachment. Utah R. Evid. 
404(a)(3).3 
4 
Defendant argues that the provisions of rule 404(b) , 
Rule 404(b) reads, in pertinent part: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. 
That subsection reads: 
(a) Character evidence generally. 
Evidence of a person's character or a trait 
of his character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving that he acted in 
conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except: 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of 
the character of a witness, as provided in 
Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
subsection reads: 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
This 
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Utah Rules of Evidence, precluded admission of evidence of his 
prior drug use and employment history. Rule 404 is not 
applicable to the present case because the evidence defendant 
complains of was not offered or admitted for the purpose of 
proving defendant's character "in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith." Utah R. Evid. 404(b). A reading of 
defendant's testimony clearly shows that the prosecutor's 
questions were a means of pure impeachment, not an attack on 
defendant's character. 
In State v. Johnson, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah Aug. 
17, 1989), the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of: 
whether the introduction of evidence of prior 
inconsistent statements constitutes an attack 
on truthfulness so as to allow the 
introduction of evidence of truthful 
character. 
115 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10. In Johnson, the defendant had 
challenged the officer-victim's recollection of the crime by 
introducing prior statements by the officer which were 
inconsistent with the officer's testimony at trial. The State 
claimed that that amounted to an attack on the officer's 
character and sought to admit evidence under rule 608(a) about 
the officer's character for truthfulness. The Supreme Court 
said: 
While we agree that an attack on a witness's 
memory may be an attack on his or her 
credibility, it is not an attack on "the 
character of the witness for truthfulness." 
In short, an attack on one's memory is not 
the same as an attack on one's character. 
4 
Cont. plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
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Id. In an accompanying footnote, the Court stated: 
While we agree that "'[a] basic rule of 
evidence provides that prior inconsistent 
statements may be used to impeach the 
credibility of a witness,'" . . . we are not 
of the view that every attack on credibility 
is an attack on character. 
115 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14 n. 33 (citations omitted). 
In an earlier case, the Supreme Court allowed 
impeachment evidence even though that evidence was also evidence 
of a prior bad act. In State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979), 
the Supreme Court said: 
We agree with, and reaffirm, the general 
principle advanced by the defendant that 
evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible 
for the purpose of disgracing the defendant 
or showing a propensity to commit crime. . . 
However, the record before us shows that 
the evidence was introduced, not for either 
one of these purposes, but to impeach the 
defendant's credibility in testifying that he 
had not previously pointed a weapon at Dirks. 
It is a well-settled rule that when a 
defendant testifies in his defense, he is 
subject to being impeached. State v. Green, 
Utah 578 P.2d 512, 513 (1978), stated: 
This includes cross-examination on any 
matter which would tend to contradict, 
explain or cast doubt upon the credibility 
of his testimony. Furthermore, any 
testimony or evidence which is purposed to 
those same objectives may be introduced in 
rebuttal. 
Since the evidence was introduced to 
impeach the defendant's credibility, it was 
admissible for that limited purpose even 
though it was also evidence of a prior bad 
act. 
603 P.2d at 812 (citation omitted). 
When a defendant opens the door about previous crimes 
or wrongs, he can then be cross-examined on those acts. As the 
Utah Supreme Court said: 
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if the defendant himself opens up the subject 
as to prior incidents, it becomes subject to 
cross-examination and refutation the same as 
any other evidence. 
State v. Lopez, 626 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1981) (footnote omitted). 
In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the United States 
Supreme Court said: 
Every criminal defendant is privileged to 
testify in his own defense, or to refuse to 
do so. But that privilege cannot be 
construed to include the right to commit 
perjury. . . . Having voluntarily taken the 
stand, [defendant] was under an obligation to 
speak truthfully and accurately, and the 
prosecution [may] utilize the traditional 
truth-testing devices of the adversary 
process [against defendant]. 
401 U.S. at 225 (citations omitted). 
In the present case, defendant makes a general claim 
that cross-examination about the details of his prior conviction 
violated rule 404(b). That rule is not applicable to evidence 
about his previous conviction for forgery which was clearly 
mandatorily admissible under rule 609(a)(2) as a crime involving 
dishonesty or false statement, as was argued in the previous 
subpoint. The details elicited, however, did raise allegations 
of illicit drug use, a crime of which defendant was not 
convicted. If this information had been elicited solely to 
demonstrate defendant's propensity toward crime, its use would 
have been improper. However, a review of defendant's testimony 
clearly shows that the information about drug use was elicited 
solely to challenge defendant's credibility. 
Defendant's testimony on direct examination by his own 
counsel was that the money he received from forging checks was 
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his own money. He said that he "needed [his] money cause [sic] 
[he] was moving out of the house. And in order to get another 
house [he] needed [his] money." (R. 125 at 25; Addendum A). The 
prosecutor properly challenged defendant's credibility by asking 
him about a statement which defendant had made when he pled 
guilty to the attempted forgery. The prosecutor asked if 
defendant hadf on the earlier occasion, said that he took the 
money to support a drug habit. When defendant testified that he 
could not remember whether he had made that statement, the 
prosecutor questioned him about drug use during that period. (R. 
125 at 28). This was proper impeachment because defendant's 
testimony at trial concerning his use for the money was directly 
contradictory to his previous statement that he had taken the 
money to support a drug habit. 
After defendant responded that he did not remember 
whether he had made the prior statement that he had obtained the 
money to support a drug habit, the prosecutor asked further 
impeachment questions. To test defendant's credibility about not 
remembering the drug habit statement, the prosecutor asked if 
defendant was on drugs when he committed the earlier forgery. 
The testimony went as follows: 
Q (by Mr. Jones) Were you on cocaine in 
April of 1988? 
A (by defendant) Had I used cocaine? 
Q Yes. 
A A few times, yes. 
Q Did you have a drug problem? 
A Not really a problem. 
Q Well, have you entered or been ordered 
to go into a drug rehabilitation program? 
A I completed it, yes. 
Q Did you complete the program? 
A Yes. 
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Q And when was that? 
A I was ordered in, I think, June of 
1988, to go. 
Q Was it your testimony that you didn't 
have a drug problem at the time you entered 
that plea? 
A No, I entered a plea of guilty. 
Q Excuse me, in April of 1988— 
A Yes, sir. 
Q —you had a drug problem at that time? 
A It was going to become a problem, yes. 
(R. 125 at 28; Addendum A). This questioning was clearly for the 
purpose of demonstrating defendant's credibility about lack of 
recollection he had claimed at first. 
The final claim, that defendant was improperly 
questioned about his unemployment, was not preserved for appeal. 
The one question asked by the prosecution was, "You were 
unemployed at the time of this incident?1' Defendant replied, 
"Yes." (R. 125 at 29). No objection was interposed to this 
question, nor was a motion to strike the answer sought. 
The trial court properly allowed the cross-examination 
of defendant which challenged the truthfulness of the testimony 
defendant was giving at trial. The court also properly cautioned 
the jury as to use they could make of the testimony regarding the 
forgery (R. 125 at 34; Addendum A). The court also gave the jury 
a cautionary instruction regarding the use of the impeachment 
testimony (R. at 79; a copy of this instruction is attached as 
Addendum B). It is presumed that the jury followed this 
instruction when it deliberated on this case. As the Utah 
Supreme Court said: 
We also gave credit to the intelligence of 
the jury when we said in State v. Hodges, 30 
Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322 (1974): 
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In the absence of the appearance of 
something persuasive to the contrary, we 
assume that the jurors were conscientious 
in performing their duty, and that they 
followed the instructions of the court. 
State v. Gardunio, 652 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Utah 1982). 
In the present case, the court's cautionary 
admonishment and instruction limited the use of defendant's 
testimony about other crimes to impeachment. The evidence was 
not used to attack defendant's character in general, or to 
establish that he had a propensity toward criminal activity; the 
evidence was used to show that defendant was being untruthful 
when he testified. Since the evidence of defendant's prior 
statements about drug use were for the limited purpose of 
impeaching his credibility, the trial court was correct in 
denying defendant's motion for mistrial on that basis. 
D. Even If Admission of This Evidence Was Improper, 
Such Error Was Harmless. 
Even if an appellate court determines that cross-
examination of a defendant about prior convictions and other 
crimes was improper, such a finding does not signal automatic 
reversal of the present conviction. If "the error had no 
prejudicial effect on the outcome of the case", reversal is not 
warranted. State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1982). In 
the Williams case, the Court found that cross-examination about 
the details of the prior conviction was improper. However, the 
conviction was affirmed because: 
[defendant's guilt was shown by 
overwhelming, untainted evidence, and there 
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is no likelihood that there would have been a 
different result in absence of the error. 
Id. 
If this Court were to find that the trial court erred 
in denying defendant's motion for mistrial on the basis of 
improper impeachment, such error was harmless. The standard for 
reversal is whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for defendant if the erroneously admitted 
evidence were excluded. State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 
1989). Such a likelihood does not exist in the present case. 
The evidence presented at trial was that defendant was standing 
next to, and then departed in, a vehicle which was at the scene 
of a burglary and theft (R. 123 at 21-22). One of the victims of 
the burglary saw, in the car, items of personal property which 
had been in the shed (R. 123 at 18). Those items were later 
found in the car by police at a trailer house three to four 
blocks from the burglary (R. 123 at 28-29 and 79). The 
codefendant testified that defendant had helped him take the 
items and put them in the car (R. 125 at 67). The fact that 
defendant testified that the property was not in the car until 
after he and the codefendant returned to the trailer house 
underscores the credibility aspect of this case. It was the 
jury's obligation to judge the credibility of the witnesses and 
to reconcile the contradictory evidence: 
The fact that there was contradictory 
testimony, without more, is not grounds for 
reversal, State v. Watts, Utah 675 P.2d 566, 
568 (1983). The conflicting evidence was 
before the jury, and it was the jury's 
responsibility to evaluate its significance. 
State v. Wulffenstein, Utah, 657 P.2d 289, 
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292 (1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 . . . 
(1983). 
State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1985) (additional 
citations omitted). The jury properly performed its function and 
determined that defendant was guilty of theft. There was ample 
independent evidence, untainted by the impeachment questions, to 
support the jury's verdict; there is no likelihood that there 
would have been a different result without the impeachment 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this L\^ day of June, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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- Q Did you at any time ever have in your possession 
or take any items of property which have been identified 
as belonging to Mr. Hansen and having come at some time 
from that shed? 
A No. I had never seen the property until it was 
taken out of the trailer by the police officers. 
8 Q Did you have further plans of your own that 
9 I afternoon? 
A I did. 
Q What were they? 
A I had a job interview at 3:30 with West Valley 
Transmissions. 
Q Were you able to keep that? 
A No. 
MR. JONES: Objection as to relevance. 
16 I THE COURT: Sustained. That will be 
17 I stricken. 
Q (By Ms. Wells) Mr. Tucker, have you previously 
been convicted of any criminal offenses? 
A Yes. 
Q And what was that offense and when? 
A In March of 1988 I was convicted of a forgery, 
attempted forgery. Attempted forgery, Class A misdemeanor. 
Q And that was a misdemeanor rather than a felony? 
24 I A Yes. 
















I surrounding that offense and your ultimate conviction? 
, Let me ask: Did you enter a plea in that matter? 
A Yes. 
Q What were the circumstances surrounding that case? 
A My sister and I were sharing a house, and I was 
putting my money into her bank account. We had a dispute 
" and I wanted my money out of her account. It's a joint 
7 account with my mother's name on the checks. 
8 She wouldn't refund my money, my parents were on 
g vacation and I needed my money cause I was moving out of the 
house. And in order to get another house I needed my money. 
So I forged my sister's signature to get my money. 
Q How much money was involved? 
A Less than $100. 
Q Again, did you enter a plea of guilty after being 
H charged with that offense? 
15 A Yes. 
16 I MS. WELLS: That's all the questions 
I have. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q Mr. Tucker, do you think you have a good recollec-
tion of the case for which you pled guilty to? 
A Do I— 
22 Q The attempted forgery that you just talked about 
23 to the Jury? 
24 I A Oh, yes. 














1 I mother? 
A Yes. 
Q And forged her name on those checks, didn't you? 
A Yes. 
Q One of the checks--the one you pled guilty to 
was in excess of $500, wasn't it? 
6
 I A I think so. 
7 Q So you are not telling the Jury that you stole 
8 J $100, are you? 
A No. 
Q How much, all totaled, did you steal from your 
mother through those checks? 
A Number one, I didn't steal it. It was my money. 
Q Well, you took checks, you stole blank checks 
from your mother, didn't you? 
A I did. 
15 Q And you forged her signature on five of those? 
16 A I did. 
17 Q How much money did you take? 
A I would say around six hundred something. 
Q You are telling us that the one check was in 
excess of $500 and the other four altogether only totaled 
$100? 
A There was a few that were not cashed. There was 
*
2
 one in my wallet that had never been cashed. 
23 Q Well, isn't it true that you had had these checks 
24 I for some time? 












Q How long had you had these checks? 
A Probably three days. 
Q You didn't have them more like three months? 
A I don't think so. 
Q Isn't it true that the reason that you took the 
checks and cashed them was to support your drug habit? 
A No. 
MS. WELLS: Your Honor, I would object--
I would ask the Court for a ruling and would like to approach 
the Bench. 
THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the 
objection. The door has been opened as to the purpose for 
the money on direct examination. 
MS. WELLS: I don' t believe that the 
door was opened in that it wasn't asked of him for what 
purpose. He merely said it was his money. And I think what 
this does is goes to a rule of evidence 404 problem. 
THE COURT: Do you need to proceed 
further on this? 
MR. JONES: I do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let's come to the side bar 
for just a moment. 
(Bench conference off the record.) 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
Q (By Mr. Jones) Mr. Tucker, is it your testimony 
to the Jury that the only reason you took those five checks 
is because you were entitled to the money? 
A Yes. 
28 
Q Do you remember filling out a statement, kind 












To a certain degree, yes. 
Did you ever tell anyone in that statement that 
you took the money was to support a drug habit? 
I can't remember. 
Were you on cocaine in April of 1988? 
Had I used cocaine? 
Yes. 
A few times, yes. 
Did you have a drug problem? 
Not really a problem. 
Well, have you entered or been ordered to go 















I completed it, yes. 
Did you complete the program? 
Yes. 
And when was that? 
I was ordered in, I think, June of 1988, to go. 
Was it your testimony that you didn't have a 
em at the time you entered that plea? 
No. I entered a plea of guilty. 
Excuse me, in April of 1988— 
Yes, sir. 
--you had a drug problem at that time? 
It was going to become a problem, yes. 
What about in March of 1989? 






















You were unemployed at the time of this incident? 
Yes. 
And it's your testimony that you just happened 
the wrong place at the wrong time on March 29, 1989? 
So to speak. 
You had no idea what your friend was up to? 
Exactly. 
You weren't on drugs that day? 
No. 
Is it true that the only person who was hiding 
officers got there was yourself? 
Yes, sir. 
And your testimony is that Mr. Kanares is the one 
responsible for this burglary and theft; is that right? 
Yes. 
But he wasn't hiding, was he? 
No, he was not. 
And the only reason you were hiding is because 
afraid? 
That, and I had a speeding ticket that had went 







and I had no desire to go back to jail. 
You weren't hiding, I guess, because of what 
over at Mr. Hansen's property? 
No. At the time on the forgery I was beat up 
by the police, and again that same day. 
When did you know or realize that this property 
was stolen? 
34 
1 Your Honor. 
2 I THE COURT: All right. Before you 
begin, Ms. Wells, members of the Jury, I want you to under-
stand one thing, and that is that the testimony regarding 
the incident of attempted forgery, a Class A misdemeanor 
to which the defendant entered a plea, is to be considered 
" only for the purpose of determining Mr. Tucker's credibility 
7 or his believability for that is the sole purpose that can 
8 be used for. 
9 Furthermore, anything beyond that mere fact that 
relates to that incident of the plea concerning the forgery 
or questions regarding what the purpose of Mr. Tucker's 
conduct was in withdrawing money or writing checks on that 
account on anything dealing with the purpose--I know you 
heard some testimony in response to questions of Mr. Jones 
about drugs, but that can only be used regarding the incident 
15 and the purpose of the withdrawals of money and for no other 
16 purpose. 
17 J MS. WELLS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. WELLS: 
Q Mr. Tucker, the offense of attempted forgery, 
did that involve your entering a plea through an agreement 
where you admitted for purposes of the plea being taken that 
22 the amount of money involved was less than $100? 
23 A Yes. 
24 I Q All right. Is that why you responded in that 















2 I Q You are not denying, however, that the total 
amount of money that came from your mother's account was 
more than $100? 
A Right. 
Q Now, with regard to Mr. Jones' question to you 
" concerning cocaine and any problem with it, in March of 1989, 
7 just a month and a half ago, or two months ago, were you 
8 | using cocaine? 
A No. 
Q On this particular day had you used any cocaine? 
A No. 
Q Did cocaine have anything to do with what was 
going on there? 
A I no longer use cocaine or any form of drugs. 
Q Now, Mr. Jones has referred to, I think, Mr. 
15 I Kanares as your friend. How would you describe—prior to 
16 I this--your relationship with him? Did you consider him to 
be a friend? 
A No. 
Q And how would you describe that relationship? 
A Just a person that I've performed work on his car 
on a couple of occasions. And I have met him at Becky's 
house. 
22 Q Did you ever socialize with him? 
23 A No. 
24 Q Had you ever worked with him prior to—I mean, 













II A Yes. 






^ them that the trunk was not open and there were no items 
of property in the car at that time? 
A Yes. 
Q Were you present at West Valley or in West Valley 
at the Kanares home when Mr. Hansen was brought back to the 
area? 
A I was. 
9 I Q And could you observe what he was shown with 
10 J regard to the car? 
A Yes. They had me in a police car in handcuffs. 
Q And what did you see Mr. Hansen shown? 
A Nothing was removed from the car. He was walked 
up to the car, and I could not see what he was shown there. 
Q To your knowledge, what was in the car at that 
time? 
•^  A At that point in time I did not know. 
17 Q Had Mr. Kanares put items back into the car then? 
18 I A Yes, he had. 
MS. WELLS: That's all I have, Mr. 
Tucker. Thank you. 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JONES: 
Q One other question. Do you remember when you 
entered the guilty plea on the attempted forgery? 
24 I A I do. 












what you did? 
A Not exactly, no. 
Q Let me see if I can refresh your memory. Do you 
remember signing something that said that at the time you 
cashed those checks your intent was to defraud someone else--
MS. WELLS: I111 object. Thatfs beyond 
the scope of cross-examination. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Jones) Are you still telling this Jury 
that the only reason you took those checks was because 
somebody owed you money? 
A Thatfs right. 
MR. JONES: Thank you. 
THE COURT: You may step down, Mr. 
Tucker. Thank you for your testimony. 
MS. WELLS: Your Honor, defense would 
have no other witnesses to call, and at this time would rest. 
THE COURT: All right. 





Yes. How long do you need? 
Ten minutes. 
All right. We are going to 
take a recess for about ten minutes. Remember the admonition 
of the Court: Do not discuss this matter with anyone, includ-
ing among yourselves. Do not form or express any opinions or 
conclusions, and if you can gather around the Jury room in 
about ten minutes, we can start at that time. We are going 
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1 to remain here just a moment. 
^ (Following proceedings continue in absence of Jury.) 
THE COURT: The record should indicate 
that the Jury has now departed. I have sets of Jury 
instructions and verdict forms, one for Mr. Jones and one 
for Mr. Tucker and one for Ms. Wells. Somebody needs to 
" check the verdict forms. This set of proposed Jury instruc-
7 tions is the result of my consideration of both sides 
g proposed Jury instructions and a short conference we had 
g after we concluded yesterday, beginning at about 4:30, and 
then further discussion this morning with counsel. 
You need to check these and alert me to any 
objections you may have that you did not previously inform 
me of. We will make formal objections on the record just 
before I instruct the Jury. 
One thing I would ask you to do, Ms. Wells, is 
15 I take the Jury instructions relating to prior convictions and 
15 I think a paragraph ought to be added to explain the circum-
yi stances of going a bit beyond the incident itself, so that 
it is very clear to the Jury-well, it should already be 
clear from the instructions that they consider that only for 
credibility. And if you wish an elaboration on that, that 
any of the other matters that were gone into on testimony 
about that incident and the purpose for the money relates to 
the credibility of Mr. Tucker in explaining that incident 
and for that purpose only. 
MS. WELLS: I will prepare such an 















1 indicated to the Court at the side bar during the first 
2 break that I would like an opportunity to make a record 
and to make a further motion. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. WELLS: Your Honor, at this time 
I would make a motion for a mistrial. The defendant made an 
appropriate motion in limine prior to the beginning of the 
7
 trial, which was subsequently heard and ruled on by the Court. 
8 Although the Court did not grant that motion, it 
9 I was clearly, I believe, the order of the Court that such 
admission by Mr.Tucker, should he testify, and of course under 
the case law he is required to testify in order to get the 
benefit of the motion and preserving it for appeal, and during 
that testimony he admitted to the conviction for attempted 
forgery, a Class A misdemeanor. 
He was not requested on direct examination to make 
any explanation beyond admission of the fact of the forgery 
16 I itself, which constitutes the crime. However, on cross-
17 J examination Mr. Jones elicited from him additional information 
which I believe was elicited contrary to the ruling of the 
Court, contrary to the spirit of the motion in limine, and 
in violation of Rule 404, the Utah Rules of Evidence, parti-
cularly subsection B dealing with other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts. 
It indicates therein that evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. 
















proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity or a sense of mistake or accident. 
There is no exception listed within 404B that 
deals with the requirement that he explain one act by having 
to then admit to some other wrong that could not otherwise 
fit into Rule 404. 
It was clearly the intent of the prosecution to 
use that information to further inflame the Jury and indicate 
to them that this was a person of bad character, more likely 
to have engaged in criminal activity in March of 1989, than 
not. 
That is particularly true in light of the specific 
reason for which he might be impeached upon testifying, which 
is to cast doubt based upon that particular crime itself, 
as to credibility. The crime that he talked about paying 
drug debts obviously deals with a different type of offense 
that is not contemplated in the arguments made to the Court 
or in the Court's ruling and its analysis under the Banner 
test. It was merely thrown in as an addition by counsel, 
and it constitutes unfair prejudice and should warrant a 
mistrial by the Court. 
THE COURT: All right. I have had plenty 
of time to think about this, and the record should reflect 
that while not to this extent, the matters were discussed at 
the side bar conference and a proffer at the time of the 
objection was made, was noted, and it was not on the record 
because it was at the side bar. I overruled that objection, 













I following reasons: Under normal circumstances the prosecution] 
based on my ruling, has the right to have before the Jury 
the fact of the conviction and what the conviction was for. 
In this particular case, however, as a matter of strategy, 
and appropriate strategy, the defendant through his counsel 
sought to bring up the information before the prosecution 
6 had an opportunity to. That is a strategic choice, and itfs 
7 probably a good one. But in so doing it was not just a 
g statement of conviction and what the conviction was for. 
g There was furthermore testimony elicited by direct examina-
tion as to what the purpose was for the act underlying the 
conviction in question. 
Once that was done, the door was opened for the 
prosecution to do more than it was otherwise entitled to do. 
My memory of that testimony was that Mr. Tucker went into 
the purposes for which he wrote bad checks. Once he did that, 
15 I then the prosecution is entitled to ask questions on cross 
16 to address the question of the purposes for the withdrawals 
Yi of money. 
As far as Ifm concerned, that's all Mr. Jones did. 
Furthermore, and for that reason, I don't think 404B is 
pertinent because it was related not to additional wrongs or 
act, but instead was related only to the conviction in 
question, and in attempting to cross-examine Mr. Tucker on 
22 the reasons for the withdrawals. For that reason I think 
23 your 404B is not appropriate, so the motion is denied. 
24 MS. WELLS: May I just indicate one more 
25 thing, Your Honor? 
ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO._jJ> 
The fact that the defendant has been convicted of a crime 
may be considered by you for only one purpose, namely, in judging 
the credibility of such testimony. The fact of such a conviction 
does not necessarily destroy or impair the defendant's 
credibility, and it does not raise a presumption that the 
defendant or witness has testified falsely. It is simply one of 
the circumstances that you are to take into consideration in 
weighing the testimony of such a witness. 
Any evidence of the circumstances or facts surrounding the 
charge and conviction of the defendant for an offense other than 
that for which he is currently on trial, including any reference 
to why a previous crime was committed, cannot be considered by 
you as evidence that the defendant is, by reason of those other 
acts or circumstances, a person of bad character or more likely 
to have committed this offense. 
